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Abstract
This paper introduces a model where elections are games where voters have prefer-
ences over a public good (policy platforms) and a private good (transfers). The model
produces the standard social choice results such as core convergence and policy separa-
tion. Furthermore, by introducing transfers, I am able to make more precise predictions
about candidate locations and their dynamics than is possible under the standard spatial
model. Another purpose of this paper lies in the creation of favored groups in elections.
Ultimately, it is important to characterize political behavior while considering the
dierent preferences that might exist in the constituents. By incorporating utility for
private goods into standard utility assumptions, this model introduces these considera-
tions into the standard spatial model, allowing us to have a richer and more nuanced
look into elections.
JEL classication numbers: C72, D72, D78
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1 Introduction
This paper examines candidate policy platforms under spatial competition in a simple
voting game. The motivation of this is to understand the spatial model when we introduce
new assumptions about the preference of the voters. A standard result in the spatial
model shows that an equilibrium typically does not exist. Even when they do, e.g., in R1
with single peaked preferences, or when the Plott conditions are satisfied, the prediction
of a majority winner typically is not very interesting. In a fundamental result of voting
theory, Ledyard proved that in equilibrium with voting costs, candidates’ policy platforms
will converge and no one would vote [6]. Another fundamental result by McKelvey showed
that, when the core does not exist, and that if the policy space is continuous, one can
get reach any policy platform via some sequence [8]. These results are certainly not a
realistic model of actual elections, when we almost never see identical policy platforms
and the election cycles are much less common than would be predicted by the Downsian
model.
Ideological position, of course, need not the only preferences voters have over candi-
dates. Another prominent modeling choice of elections involves vote buying, or equiv-
alently as a redistribution game. These models view elections as a game where voters’
preferences lie over private goods, i.e., transfers, whereas the Downsian model views it
as a game over public goods, i.e., ideology. The vote buying approach began with the
seminal paper of Baron and Ferejohn [1]. Their model in turn was based on the Rubin-
stein bargaining model, in which agents bargain over the distribution of a fixed amount
of private goods. They model the bargaining process as one where legislators are rec-
ognized, make a proposal, and vote. Compared to the Downsian world, the bargaining
approach provides precise predictions about equilibrium behavior when the Downsian
model would predict chaos. A prominent vote buying models is that of Myerson [10]. In
the Myerson model candidates compete for voters by promising to voters a draw from a
random distribution that is identical for all voters. Voters votes for the candidate under
whom they received the best realization of the random distribution. Lizzeri extends this
model to a two period world, where candidates compete in both periods.
Here I combine the two ideas and model elections as a game where voters have prefer-
ences over both policy platforms and distributional considerations. Simply put, although
there may always be some policy position that will defeat an incumbent, there are a
number of advantages that the incumbent that can help in an election. By combining a
spatial model and a distributive model, I am able to derive ideological policy separation.
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The intuition is straightforward: given the incumbent’s position, the challenger wants to
maximize the amount the incumbent will have to pay to “buy off” the voters.
The model here is similar to that of Jackson and Moselle [5]. They considered a
legislative voting game where legislators have preferences on a distributive dimension
as well as an ideological dimension. The legislators play a Baron-Ferejohn bargaining
game with a random recognition rule, where the game ends when a proposal receives a
majority of the vote. Their paper is motivated by a similar observation, that legislators
have preferences over both ideology as well as distribution, and that the distribution
aspect adds to the standard Downsian model both realism and predictive power.
The present model differs from Jackson and Moselle in that I assume a much more
structured game, namely, a Stackelberg game in which there exists a leader and an en-
trant, instead of the potentially infinitely repeated bargaining game considered in most
bargaining games. Whereas an infinitely repeated bargaining game has a natural in-
terpretation for a legislative game, a sequential model makes more sense in an election
context. Namely, the incumbent’s policy platform is likely to be quite similar to his lo-
cation from the previous election. A challenger enters and chooses a policy platform. In
the traditional Downsian model, this generally means certain loss to the incumbent, un-
less the core exists and the incumbent is located there. Here we introduce a distributive
dimension. The simple structure of this game also allows this model to be generalized to
take account of multi-dimensional ideological policy space, which was not considered in
Jackson and Moselle.
Another purpose of this paper lies in the creation of favored groups in elections. This
is similarly the motivation of Myerson [10]. Whereas Myerson’s motivation is to explain
differences in offers to otherwise identical voters, I am interested in the trade-offs that
candidates make on the distributive dimension versus the ideological dimension. In the
section where I extend the model to one where the challenger has distributive income, I
will give conditions under which the incumbent will distribute to various voters.
This model also is similar to Bernhardt and Ingberman [2] in spirit. As Bernhardt
and Ingberman noted, the results in the classical Downsian model holds because of the
extreme assumptions about the structure of the game in which the agents are playing.
If we relax those assumptions, the predictions of the model change accordingly. This
model therefore can be seen as a complementary effort from that of Bernhardt and
Ingberman. Whereas they adds in uncertainty to the Downsian world, this model adds
another dimension on which voters have preferences over.
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Wuﬄe et al. [12] presented a model based on the idea that incumbents have certain
advantages that the challengers may not. Specifically, in their model, they assume that
the incumbent can move within some area of his proposed ideological position, or equiv-
alently, that voters have fat indifference curves. They proposed ”Finagle’s Law,” which
states that “No matter what happens, you can always come out ahead if you just know
how to finagle.” In the Finagle model, incumbents pick a position, but can subsequently
alter their policy position, i.e., “Finagling.” The incumbents have limitations on how far
they are able to “finagle.” With this they were able to find the “Finagling point,” defined
as a point that minimizes the distance that the candidate must move, or “finagle” in
order to beat the challenger. Somewhat surprisingly, under the assumption of Euclidean
preferences, the “Finagling Point” for three voters is located at the same point as the
optimal incumbent location in the current model.
The Finagling model can be seen as a complementary effort to explain the incumbency
advantage observed empirically. Unlike the Finagle model, however, the model presented
here makes precise predictions on where the challenger would locate. This allows me to
draw some implications about the dynamics of the model. In a three voter case. I am
able to show that the optimal incumbent position is an unstable equilibrium. That is,
should the incumbent ever lose the election (which happens with positive probability by
construction) at θ, candidates’ ideological position will come back to the θ.
There still exist, however, several difficulties with this interpretation of elections.
First, pork, once distributed to the voters, is gone. We therefore run into the commit-
ment problem—voters cannot credibly commit to voting for either candidate. The same
problem exists if we interpret it as a case of the incumbent making promises of pork.
We can suppose that there exists some “warm-glow” effect of delivery pork in the here
and now. Under this interpretation, incumbents have the advantage of delivery pork
immediately rather than in the future. The interpretation that I prefer is one in which
candidates have varying “qualities” of delivering pork, i.e., one is Robert Byrd and the
other is John Doe. By giving transfers, a candidate is displaying his ability of delivering
future transfers. Ultimately, it is important to characterize political behavior while con-
sidering the different preferences that might exist in the constituents. By incorporating
utility for private goods, e.g., pork, into standard utility assumptions, it will perhaps
give us a richer and more nuanced into elections.
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2 The Election Model
Candidates There are 2 candidates, an incumbent I and a challenger C. The can-
didates are office motivated and expected utility maximizers. Denote χwin be the indi-
cator function of whether the candidate wins; let uj(χwin) = 1 if χwin = 1, otherwise
uj(χwin) = 0 if χwin = 0.
There is an ideological policy space Θ ⊂ Rm. Assume Θ to be compact. Candidates
choose an ideological position θ ∈ Θ.
In addition to the ideological position, candidates choose a transfer vector t to the
voters. The budget of the transfers is denoted B, so that
∑
i ti ≤ B. Furthermore, the
distributions of the budgets Fj, for j ∈ {I, C} are common knowledge and are assumed
to have bounded support [0, Tj], for j ∈ {I, C}.
Denote (θj, tj) ∈ Θ× Rn to be the policy position of the candidates.
Voters Each voter has preferences over the ideological location, which is public, and
the transfer, which is private. So preferences are represented by a utility function ui :
Θ×R 7→ R. The utility function ui(θ, t) is nonnegative, continuous, and strictly increasing
in ti, for every θ ∈ Θ.
The voters votes for candidate j if ui(θj, tj) > ui(θk, θk), for j, k ∈ {I, C}, j 6= k.
Voters’ preferences over the ideological location and transfers are separable. Thus,
∀(θ, t), (θ′, t′),
ui(θ, ti) > ui(θ
′, ti)⇔ ui(θ, t′i) > ui(θ′, t′i).
In addition, voters have an ideal point θ∗i , such that ui(θ
∗
i , ti) > ui(θ, ti), ∀ti, θ 6= θ∗i .
For tractability, I will assume throughout that voters’ utility function are quasi-linear
in transfer. The utility function is hence ui(θ, ti) = v(θ
∗
i , θ)+ti, where v(θ
∗
i , θ) is assume to
be pseudo-concave. That is, if ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ with θ 6= θ′,5ui(θ)(θ′−θ) ≤ 0⇒ ui(θ′) < ui(θ).
In some cases I am able to derive results only for the Euclidean utility function, where
ui(θ, ti) = ‖θ∗i − θ‖+ ti.
The Election There are two dates. At date 1 there are three stages.
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Stage 0 Nature chooses BI , BC , and reveals to the candidates FI(BI), FC(BC), assumed
to be common knowledge.
Stage 1 The incumbent (or nature), chooses θI ∈ Θ.
Stage 2 The challenger chooses θC ∈ Θ conditional on θI .
At the date 1, nature reveals to the incumbent BI , and the challenger BC . There are
two stages in date 2.
Stage 1 The incumbent chooses a transfer vector tI ∈ Rn.
Stage 2 The challenger chooses a transfer vector tC ∈ Rn, conditional on tI .
Stage 3 The voters vote for the candidate that maximizes their utility.1
3 Challenger with No Transfers
In this section I will present the results where the challenger has no transfers; thus
BC = 0. I will show that even when the challenger has no money, we are able to obtain
separation of policy platforms. Because of the tractability of the problem, I am also able
to derive results based on multi-dimensional policy space, as well as dynamics of the
model.
3.1 Equilibrium characterization
We will backward induct and solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium. Because the
challenger has no transfers to distribute to the voters, we can start with the incumbent’s
optimal vote buying strategy.
Incumbent’s vote buying strategy Let the minimum amount of money that the
incumbent needs to win the election be
t∗(θC , θI) ≡ min
t
∑
i
ti : |{ui(θI , t) > ui(θC , 0)}| ≥ n/2 (1)
1To avoid open-set nonexistence problems, I will assume that ties are always resolved in favor of the
incumbent.
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The incumbent will win the election if the realized value tI > t
∗, and lose otherwise.
Challenger’s ideological positioning strategy The challenger’s utility given θI and
the reaction function of the incumbent, is
uC(θC , θI , t
∗(·)) = Pr (TI < t∗(θC,θI))u(χwin = 1) (2)
+ Pr(TI ≥ t∗(θC , θI))u(χwin = 0)
= F (t∗(θC,θI))
This is an increasing function of t. Therefore the optimal positioning strategy is
θ∗C(θI , t) = max
θC
t∗(θC,θI) (3)
Incumbent’s ideological positioning strategy If the incumbent could position him-
self, he would be placed such that he maximize his utility given the reaction function of
the challenger and his own reaction function in the vote buying period. The incumbent’s
utility is given by
uI(θI , θ
∗
C(·), t(·)) = Pr(TI ≥ t∗(θ∗C(θI), θI))uI(χwin = 1) (4)
+ Pr(TI ≤ t∗(θ∗C(θI), θI))uI(χwin = 0) (5)
= 1− F (t∗(θC , θI))
which is a decreasing function of t∗, so the optimal positioning strategy is given by
θ∗I (θ
∗
C(·), t∗(·)) = min
θI
t(θC , θI) (6)
Existence of equilibrium in this model depends critically on the sequential nature of
the game. Had we assumed that this to be a simultaneous move game, we would run into
the “Colonel Blotto” problem [10], where the equilibrium is almost impossible to solve
for.
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3.2 Ideological Position in One Dimension
Black’s theorem proves that, in one dimensional ideological policy space with single
peaked preferences, the core is non-empty [8]. In particular, the core is located at the
median voter’s ideal point, denoted θm.
3.2.1 Non-convergence to core
I prove here that in the current model, if the incumbent is not located at θm, the challenger
will not either. Assume throughout wolog that θI < θm, where θm is the median of the
distribution.
Proposition 1 (Euclidean Preferences) Suppose that voters had Euclidean utility in
the ideological dimension, and that ideal points are distributed according to F , assumed
to be continuous and strictly increasing. Let F be restricted wolog to [0, 1]. Then if the
incumbent locates at θI 6= θm, the challenger will also locate such that θC 6= θm.
Proof. Suppose not, and that θC = θm. Also assume wolog that θI < θm. The
probability that the challenger wins is F (τ(θC)), which is strictly increasing in τ . Let
θ′ = θI + θC−θI2 , then
uC(θC) = max
θC
∫ θC
θ′
(θ − θ′) dF (θ) +
∫ θm
θC
(θC − θI) dF (θ),∀θI < θC ≤ θm
Apply Leibnitz’s rule, and differentiate u′C(θC) we have FOC
1
2
(
(−θC + θI)f(θC) + 2
∫ θm
θC
f(θ)dθ −
∫ θC
θ′
f(θ)dθ
)
≡ 0 (7)
Since θC = θm, the middle term is 0, so
(−θ∗C + θI)f(θ∗C) =
∫ θ∗C
θ′
f(θ)dθ
But θC ≥ θI , so (−θC + θI) ≤ 0, which implies that the LHS ≤ 0. The RHS ≥ 0
however, with zero at θ′ = θI + θC−θI2 , or that θI = θC = θm, a contradiction.
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Next we check the SOC. Unfortunately there may be several local maxima. However,
we can still show that θ∗C 6> θm. Let θC = θm, then
uC(θC) =
∫ θm
θ′
(θ − θ′)f(θ)dθ, ∀θI > θm
Differentiating uC(θC), we have FOC
−1
2
∫ θm
θ′
f(θ)dθ
which is negative everywhere. Thus θC ∈ (θI , θm).
Example 1 (Uniform distribution) Suppose that voters have Euclidean preferences,
and that ideal points are distributed uniformly over [0, 1], we then have
τ(θC) =
∫ θC
θ′
(θ − θ′) dθ +
∫ θm
θC
(θC − θI) dθ
= −1
8
(θC − θI)(7θC + θI − 8θm)
FOC gives
−7
4
θ∗C +
3
4
θI + θm ≡ 0
θ∗C =
3
7
θI +
4
7
θm. (8)
The uniform distribution of voters also gives a global maximum, since τ ′′(θC) = −74 .
The challenger’s ideological position is therefore a convex combination of the incumbent’s
ideological position and the median voter’s ideal point. Suppose that θI = 0, θm = 1, then
θ∗C ≈ 0.57.
Next I generalize this result to pseudo-concave preferences.
Lemma 1 Suppose that voters’ preferences are pseudo-concave and that their ideal points
are distributed according to F , assumed to be continuous. If θI < θm, then θ
∗
C(θI) < θm.
Proof. Suppose not, and that θ′C = θ
∗
C(θI) > θm. Then let θC = θm. It must be that
m(θ
′
C) > m(θC). By pseudo-concavity of the utility function, the incumbent will the
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closest voters not in his coalition. So
t∗(θC) =
∫ θm
m(θC)
[u(θ, θC)− u(θ, θI)] f(θ)dθ (9)
t∗(θ′C) =
∫ θm
m(θ′C)
[u(θ, θ′C)− u(θ, θI)] f(θ)dθ. (10)
where
∫ θm
m(θC)
f(θ)dθ >
∫ θm
m(θ′C)
f(θ)dθ as m(θ
′
C) > m(θC).
Furthermore I will prove that 9 is point-wise greater than 10. By single peakedness
property of pseudo-concave preferences,
[u(θ, θC)− u(θ, θI)]− [u(θ, θ′C)− u(θ, θI)] > 0,
as θ < θm = θC < θ
′
C .
The above proposition states that, given the incumbent’s ideological location, the
challenger will not “jump” to the other side of the median.
Proposition 2 (Pseudo-concave preferences) Suppose that voters have pseudo-concave
utility functions in the ideological dimension, and that ideal points are distributed accord-
ing to F , assumed to be continuous and strictly increasing. Let F be restricted wolog to
[0, 1]. Then if the incumbent locates at θI 6= θm, the challenger will also locate such that
θC 6= θm. Furthermore, θ∗C ∈ (θI , θm).
Proof. By lemma 1, θC ≤ θm, thus we only have to consider the case that θ∗C ∈ (θI , θm].
Let m(θC) ≡ {θ : u(θ, θC) = u(θ, θI)}.
uC(θC) =
∫ θm
m(θC)
[u(θ, θC)− u(θ, θI)] f(θ)dθ
Taking FOC gives ∫ θm
m(θC)
uθ(θ, θC)f(t)dθ + f(m(θC))(−u(m(θC), θC)) (11)
+ u(m(θC), θI))m
′(θC)
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Setting θC = θm, expression 11 becomes∫ θm
m(θC)
uθ(θ, θm)f(t)dθ + f(m(θm))(−u(m(θm), θm)) (12)
+ u(m(θm), θI))m
′(θm)
=
∫ θm
m(θC)
uθ(θ, θm)f(t)dθ
By the definition of m(θC), the second term in 12 is equal to 0. Expression 12 is
negative, since by the definition if single peakedness, if θ′ < θ < θm ⇔ u(θ) > u(θ′).
To prove that θ∗C(θI) ∈ (θI , θm), set θC = θI . Expression 11 is equal to
∫ θm
m(θI)
uθ(θ, θI)dθ,
and is positive. Since uC(θC) is continuous on (θI , θm), it has an interior maximum in
(θI , θm).
3.2.2 Asymptotic convergence to core
Although the proposition 1 challenger does not locate on the core, it does show that the
challenger moves closer to the core relative to the incumbent, since that is the only way
the challenger could win.
Example 2 (Uniform distribution) Suppose that voters have Euclidean utility func-
tion and that ideal points are distributed uniformly over [0, 1],then by equation 8 the rate
of convergence is 3/7.
We wish to show that limk→∞ θ∞C (θI) = θm.
Proposition 3 (pseudo-concave preferences) Suppose that voters’ preferences are
pseudo-concave, and that their ideal points are distributed according to F , assumed to be
continuous. Suppose also that θ′C(θ) ≥ 0. Let F be restricted wolog to [0, 1]. Then ∀ε, ∃δ
such that θ∞C (θI)− θm < ε, ∀θ ∈ Θ.2
Proof. Define θ∗ as the point of convergence, by the fact that
{
θkC
}∞
k=1
is a monotone
sequence and is bounded at θm. We thus have 0 < θ
∗ − θC(θ∗ − ε) < ε. By taking a first
2The proof of this proposition is incomplete. There should be some theorem that I can use but don’t
know.
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order Taylor expansion,
0 < θ∗ − θC(θ∗ − ε) < ε
≈ θ∗ − [θC(θ∗) + εθ′C(θ∗)]
= θ∗ − θC(θ∗)− εθ′C(θ∗) < ε
By assumption θ′C(θ
∗) ≥ 0, so
θ∗ − θC(θ∗)− εC < ε
θ∗ − θC(θ∗) < ε(1 + C)
The technical condition that θ′C(θ) ≥ 0 is necessary for the result that candidate
positions converge toward the median. However, I was not able to prove this for the
general pseudo-concave case.
3.2.3 Extension to multiple stage game
Proposition 4 (non-commitment) Denote the vector of distributive resources the in-
cumbent spends by a. At stage 1, the incumbent will not commit any distributive re-
sources, such that
∑
i ai = 0 and that ai ≥ 0,∀i.
Proof. I will show that committing resources at stage 1 is a weakly dominated strategy.
Let θC = θ be the position of the challenger if the incumbent follows the equilibrium
strategy, then by optimality the incumbent will spend t(θ) = t. Now suppose that the
incumbent deviates and spends a in the first and second period, respectively, such that∑
i ai > 0. Also denote ta = t − a. Let A = Pθ(θI). Let θ′ be the position of the
challenger when the incumbent deviates. Denote B = Pθ′(θI). If θ
′ 6= θ, then it must be
that ∑
i∈B∩A
ai + ti(θ
′) +
∑
j∈B\A
tj(θ
′) ≥
∑
i∈A
ai + tai(θ)
=
∑
i∈A
ti(θ)
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Therefore spending a positive amount at stage 1 is a weakly dominated strategy.
It is easy to see why the above proposition is true. Given the zero sum nature of the
game, if the incumbent’s choice affects the challenger’s choice, then it must be for the
worse to the incumbent. If the incumbent is buying voters before the challenger moves, he
is essentially moving the voters ideal points so that they satisfy the Plott conditions, i.e.,
such that the incumbent’s position is in the core. On the other hand, if the incumbent
waits until the challenger has moved, he will only have to buy a subset of the voters,
because the winset is the union of disjoint sets.
Proposition 4 shows that we can extend a game where the challenger has no money
to one in which there are an arbitrary number of periods. It suffices to note that, as long
as the incumbent has the last move, he can always wait until after the challenger moves
to decide on the distributional dimension.
3.3 Multiple Ideological Dimensions
Throughout the previous section we have assumed that the incumbents cannot move to
the median voter’s ideal point. It is conceivable that the distribution of the voters have
changed since the last election, due to for example, immigration, new industry, etc. If we
were to relax this assumption and allow the incumbents to move before the challenger,
then the incumbent will simply move to the median voter’s ideal point. Since by as-
sumption indifferent voters vote for the incumbent, the incumbent wins with probability
1.3
Here I extend the ideological space to multiple dimensions. As mentioned in the
introduction, extension of the ideological space to Rn introduces voting cycles and the
emptiness of the core. It is here that transfers can serve to a great degree to provide
stability as well as pin down the policy position of the voters.
First I introduce a very simple result concerning incumbent ideological position when
the core exists.
Proposition 5 Suppose that C(R) 6= ∅, then θ∗I ∈ C(R).
3Even if we assume that the challenger wins ties, the only case where the incumbent will lose is if
BI = 0, which occurs with probability 0.
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Proof. Let x ∈ C(R), by the definition of the core, |{i : ui(y) > ui(x)}| ≤ n/2,∀y ∈ X.
And so the incumbent wins with probability 1 by spending nothing. Assume not, and
that θ∗I = x
′ 6∈ C(R), then ∃y ∈ X such that |{i : ui(y) > ui(x)}| > n/2. Thus ∀y ∈
X, t∗(x) > 0 > t∗(x′).
3.3.1 Empty Core
Next I will show that if the core does not exist, the challenger will not hold the same
ideological position as the incumbent. This result is not a simple consequence of the
assumption that the incumbent will always win if they hold the same positions. Indeed,
the result will hold even if we assume that the challenger always wins. Formally, I claim
∀θI ,∃ε > 0 such that θ∗C 6∈ Ne(θI), where Nε is a epsilon neighborhood around θI .
Definition 1 Denote
Pθ(θ
′) = {i : ui(θ) > ui(θ′)}
winset(θ) ≡
{
θ′ : |Pθ′(θ)| > n
2
}
.
In words, Pθ(θ
′) is set of voters who prefer θ to θ′. The winset of the ideological position
θ is the set of ideological positions that would defeat θ under majority rule.
Proposition 6 (Non-convergence in platform) Suppose that voters utilities are pseudo-
concave, that the core is empty, then ∀θI ,∃ε > 0, θ 6∈ Nε(θI) such that ui(θ) > ui(θ′),∀θ′ ∈
Nε(θI),∀i ∈ Pθ(θI).
Proof. Case 1: θI 6∈ closure(winset(θI)). Trivial.
Case 2: θI ∈ closure(winset(θI)). Assume that ∃θI such that ∀ε, θ 6∈ Nε(θI), ∃θ′ ∈
Nε(θI), i ∈ Pθ(θI) such that. ui(θ) < ui(θ′). In particular, there exists a θ∗ ∈ winset(θI)∩
Nε(θI) such that. ui(θ
′) > ui(θ∗). Since ε is arbitrary, this must hold for all θˆ ∈
(θI , θ
′). But u(·) is assumed continuous, so limθ→θI ui(θ) = ui(θI). This implies that
∃θ ∈ winset(θI) such that 5ui(θI) · (θ − θI) > 0.
Example 3 Figure 1 shows an example where m = 2, n = 3. Normalize incumbent’s
policy position is to (0, 0). The voters’ ideal points are (7, 26), (11,−26), (−24,−20).
The challenger’s probability of election is maximized by choosing a position in the
winset of θI that would require the incumbent to pay the greatest transfer to the voters.
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Figure 1: Indifference curves through the incumbent’s ideological position (normalized
to (0,0)). The colored regions denote the winsets.
We maximize the transfers by choosing a point that maximizes the difference within the
colored regions, which is between the ideal points (11,−26), (−24,−20). Because the
incumbent only needs to buy off one voter, the challenger will choose the midpoint of the
line segment
y + 26 = − 6
35
x− 11 ∩ (x− 11)
2
||(11,−26)||
(y + 26)2
||(11,−26)||
∩ (x− 24)
2
||(−24,−20||
(y − 20)2
||(−24,−20|| ,
located at (17.5,−23)
The incumbent needs to buy off at least one voter. The minimum amount of transfer
that is needed is easily calculated to be
||(11,−26)||+ ||(−24,−20|| − ||(11,−26)− (−24,−20)||
2
≈ 11.98
And the probability that the challenger will win is F (11.98).
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3.4 Case with 3 Voters
3.4.1 Optimal Incumbent Positioning
First I will show the predictions of the model with 3 voters. Similar to [4], the principle
of the strategy is one similar to the “no soft-spot” strategy. Surprisingly, despite the
vastly different motivations of the models, the optimal incumbent position has the same
solution as the Finagle point. This, however, is an artifact of the assumption that the
utility function of the votes is linear with respect to the transfer and are identical for all
voters. I follow Wuﬄe et al. [12] and sketch the algorithm to find the optimal ideological
location for the incumbent.
Let AB denote the Euclidean distance of the line segment connecting A and B. The
sizes of the winsets given X are
g1(X) = XA+XB − c
g2(X) = XA+XC − b
g3(X) = XB +XC − a
where XA is the Euclidean distance from X to A, and XA as the line segment connecting
X and A. Since Euclidean distance, the minimum function, the maximum function, and
the composition of convex functions are all convex, we have
h(X) ≡ {X : g1(X) = g2(X) = g3(X) = δ}4
I take a shortcut in finding the geometric solution, and instead find the algebraic solu-
tion. Reorient and normalize the triangle such that the vertices are (a1, a2), (−12 , 0), (12 , 0).
There is a unique solution to H(X∗) = (x∗1, x
∗
2) =
(
a1,
1−4a22
4a2
)
.
I will not dwell on the optimal incumbent position given three voters. Wuﬄe et al.
explored a number of properties of the Finagling circle. In particular, they showed that
the finagle radius is proportional to the half-winset, which is proportional to the winset.5
Furthermore, the finagle radius is maximized relative to the yolk when the triangle is
equilateral, and that, as the triangle becomes more acute or obtuse, we can make the
4For a proof of the optimality of h(X), see [12].
5The half-winset is defined as the set of points which are obtained by uniformly reducing each ray in
the winset of that point by half. [12]
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finagle radius, or equivalently, the size of the winset, arbitrarily small. The intuition is
straightforward, as a angles become smaller, the triangle moves toward becoming colinear,
satisfying the conditions for core existence.
3.4.2 Cycles
Here I show that although the optimal incumbent position is in the interior of the Pareto
set, it is not stable. That is, once the incumbent is defeated, the policy platform will
never get back to that position. Furthermore, if the voters have Euclidean preferences,
the ideological policy platform will follow a closed cycle along the 3 contract curves.
First note that, as long as the core symmetry conditions are not met, any coalition
within the Pareto set has blocking coalition of size 2. I will prove that as long as the
incumbent is positioned in the Pareto set, the challenger’s optimal ideological position
will be on one of the three contract curves between the voters. The proposition below
shows that, if the incumbent is located in the interior of the Pareto set, then as soon
as that incumbent loses, the ideological platform will never move to the interior of the
Pareto set again.
Lemma 2 Define the contract set of the voters as C(i, j) = {θ : 5ui(θ) = −α5 uj(θ),
for some l, k ≥ 0 (but not both zero)}. Suppose that C(R) = ∅, n = 3, and that utility
functions of the voters are pseudo-concave, then the ∩i 6=jC(i, j) = ∅, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
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Proof. Suppose not, and that ∃θ∗, i 6= j 6= k such that θ∗ ∈ C(i, j) ∩ C(j, k). Then it
must be that 5ui(θ) = −α 5 uj(θ),∀i, j. But by the fact that C(R) = ∅, there must
exist i, j such that 5ui(θ) 6= −α5 uj(θ).
Proposition 7 Suppose that n = 3, C(R) = ∅, and that θI is in the Pareto set, then
θ∗C(θI) ∈ C(i.j), for some i, j.
Proof. Because θI is in the Pareto set and n = 3, max |winset | = min |winset | = 2.
Therefore the incumbent only has to buy 1 voter to win with the minimum buying power
of mini∈Pθ′ (θ) ui(θ
′)−ui(θ). The challenger will choose from {θ′ : mini∈Pθ′ (θ) ui(θ′)−ui(θ)}.
Assume that θ ≡ θ∗C(θI) 6∈ C(i, j), ∀i, j. Then ∃θ′ such that 5ui(θ)(θ′ − θ) > 0 for at
least 2 voters. Thus the challenger can improve upon his positioning by choosing θ′′ in
the direction of 5ui(θ)(θ′ − θ), contradicting the optimality of θ.
Euclidean Preferences The above proposition showed that the contract curves of the
voters are attractive for pseudo-concave preferences. The next proposition shows that if
voters have Euclidean preferences, the policy path follows a closed cycle.
Proposition 8 (Closed Cycle) If there are 3 voters, who have Euclidean preferences,
the policy positions of the candidates will follow a closed cycle.
Proof. I will prove the proposition using Banach’s Fixed Point Theorem, which states
that if X is a non-empty complete metric space and f : X 7→ X is a strict contraction,
then f has a unique fixed point x∗. Furthermore, x∗ = limk→∞ fk(x),∀x ∈ X.
First note that because the core is empty, the winset is non-empty, for all θ. Therefore
by the assumption that the incumbent’s budget is distributed over the interval [0, b], the
probability that the challenger will win is strictly positive. By lemma 2, the challenger’s
ideological position will always be at the contract curve of exactly two of the three voters.
Lemma 3 shows that the cycle will occur in only one direction. That is, if f1(α) = β,
then f2(β) = γ, and f3(γ) = α.
Let β = f1(α), γ = f2(β), α = f3(γ) . Define the composition function g(α) =
f3 ◦ f2 ◦ f1(α) = α. To prove that this function is a contraction, we need∣∣∣∣ dgdα
∣∣∣∣ < 1,∀α ∈ Θ. (13)
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Take f1(α) first, by the law of cosine (see figure 2),
β =
1
b
(
(1− α)a− 1
2
[
(1− α)a+
√
(αa)2 + c2 − 2αc cosB − b
])
.
b
a
c
A
B
C
αa
βb
γc
Figure 2: Cycle
It follows that
b
df1(α)
dα
= −a− 1
2
[
−a+ 1
2
2αa2 − 2ac cosB√
(αa)2 + c2 − 2αc cosB
]
= −a
2
[
1 +
αa− c cosB√
(αa)2 + c2 − 2αc cosB
]
(14)
The fraction in expression 14 is
αa− c cosB√
(αa)2 + c2 − 2αc cosB = sin θ, for some θ,
where sin θ = 1 iff θ = pi/2 iff the ideal points are colinear.
− a
b
< f ′1(α) = −
a
2b
[1 + sin θ] < 0,∀α (15)
This implies that the mapping from side BC to side AC reaches a maximum in β
when α = 0, which implies that βb ≤ 1
2
(a+ b− c). Thus θC(θC(θI)) ∈ AB. By symmetry
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of equation 15, this implies that θC will be mapped back to BC.
Now I will prove 13. By symmetry, we have 0 > f ′2(β) > − bc , 0˙ > f ′3(γ) > − ca .
Therefore, 0 > g′(α) > −1, and g′(α) is a contraction whose range is within its domain
[0, 1
2b
(a+ c− b)]. Therefore by Banach’s fixed point theorem, a fixed point exists and is
globally attractive.
Lemma 3 (Direction of Cycle) Let BC ≡ {θ : θ ∈ αB+(1−α)C, ∀α ∈ [0, 1]}, θC(θI) ∈
BC, then θC ∈ AC if αa ≤ 12(a + c − b). By symmetry, θC ∈ AB if βb ≤ 12(a + b − c),
and θC ∈ BC if θC ∈ BC if γc ≤ 12(b+ c− a).
Proof. For any θ ∈ BC,∫
dθ′ = (1− α)a+
√
(αa)2 + c2 − 2αc cosB − b, ∀θ′ ∈ winset(θ) ∩ AC∫
dθ′′ = αa+
√
(αa)2 + c2 − 2αc cosB − a, ∀θ′′ ∈ winset(θ) ∩ AB
Thus, challenger will choose the ideological position θC in max{
∫
dθ′,
∫
dθ′′}.
Example 4 (Equilateral Triangle) Here I will show an example with three votes with
euclidean preferences whose ideal points form an equilateral triangle. The orbit formed
by the model is quite surprising, as it does not seem to bear any relationship to the yolk
besides both being in the Pareto set.
Without loss of generality we can transform the ideal points of the voters to (−1
2
,− 1
2
√
3
),
(0, 1√
3
), (1
2
,− 1
2
√
3
). The optimal location of the incumbent, if the incumbent were free to
choose his ideological position, he would trivially choose the center of the triangle, located
at (0, 0). But the cycle shows that it moves away from (0, 0).
Conjecture 1 With Euclidean preferences, the optimal path of the candidates will follow
a closed cycle.
Remark 1 I was unable to solve for the optimal path of the candidates with n > 3. I was
able to numerically solve for the optimal path of candidates’ ideological location. Below I
show an example with 21 voters.
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Figure 3: An example ideological policy cycle where voters’ ideal points form an equilat-
eral triangle centered on (0, 0), with edge lengths 1. The blue dots represent voter ideal
points; red dots the optimal challenger location. Incumbent initially located at (0, 0).
4 Challenger with money
In this section, I extend the case where TC > 0, such that BC ∈ [0, TC ]. Because
of the complexity of the problem, I will present results for one dimensional ideological
policy space. This becomes then an extension of the Groseclose and Snyder [4] model.
I will therefore retain much of the terminology in the Groseclose and Snyder model.
The intuition behind the Groseclose and Snyder is quite simple. Given any allocation
of transfers by the incumbent, the challenger will buy off the cheapest voters. The
incumbent’s optimal strategy is to make all voters equally expensive to buy.6
The optimal buying strategies in the Groseclose and Snyder model are characterized
by a series of cutoffs given the incumbent budget. They considered the case when the
first move knows the budget of the second mover, whereas in the current model the
first mover (incumbent) knows only the distribution of the second mover’s (challenger)
budget. Below I will consider all cases and calculate the challenger’s optimal ideological
location maximizing the candidate’s expected utility by integrating over the choice of
the incumbent’s optimal buying strategy. Define the minimum amount the challenger
needs to win by t∗C(θI , θC , tI)
7. Since the incumbent knows only the distribution of the
6For proof of optimality, see Groseclose and Snyder [4].
7Following Groseclose and Snyder, I will not characterize B’s equilibrium strategies, because they’re
less interesting. And since all the information is revealed in the game, it becomes a trivial problem for
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Figure 4: Ideological location path for 21 voters with randomly distributed ideal points
on [0, 1]2: The blue dots represent voter ideal points. the red dots represent optimal
challenger location. Incumbent initially located at (0.65, 0.74).
challenger’s budget, his expected utility is: uI(tI , θC , t
∗
C(·)) =
∫ TC
0
FC(t < t
∗
C(θC , θI , tI).
Given the optimal buying strategy, which I will characterize below, the expected utility of
the challenger is uC(θC , θI , t
∗
I(·), t∗C(·)) =
∫ TI
0
FC [t > t
∗
C(θC , θI , tI)] f(t)dt.The challenger
therefore chooses θ∗C(θI) = maxθC
∫ TI
0
F [t < t∗(θC , θI , tI)] f(t)dt.
In the next few sections, I will find the optimal challenger location over the range
incumbent budgets characterized by these cut-points. I will then expect over the incum-
bent budget, and find the expected optimal challenger. There are 4 cases of optimal
incumbent voting buying function to consider, characterized by cutoff points. I assume
that θI is given exogenously, where θI < θm. The universal case I will prove for arbitrary
distributions. The others I will restrict attention to the uniform. Groseclose and Snyder
deals with uniform distribution throughout.
4.1 Universal
Here I will assume that voters have Euclidean preferences and that voters are distributed
on a uniform distribution. In a universal coalition, the candidates buy all voters, and
bring the voters’ utility to the same level. Assume voters are distributed according to
B: either he can win or he can’t with the realization of tC . For details, see [4].
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Figure 5: Voter utility for Euclidean preferences under uniform distribution where θC =
0.1, θI = 0.4.
the cdf F (θ), which is differentiable and has an associated density f(θ). The incumbent
can therefore bring all voters to v(θC), where v(θC) is defined as
v(θC) = BI −
∫ θC
θI
(θC − θI − d(θ, θI , θC))f (θ) dθ
−
∫ 1
θC
2(θC − θI)f(θ)dθ + θC − θI
where d(θ, θI , θC) = − |θ − θI |+ |θ − θC |. We wish to find minθC v(θC). Taking FOC, we
have 1 − 2 ∫ 1
θ∗C
f(θ)dθ = 0. Rearranging terms, and F (θ∗C) = 1/2, implying that θ
∗
C is
located at the median. Taking SOC gives us v′′(θC) = 2f(θC) ≥ 0.
Graphically, figure 6 shows that the incumbent’s spending can be separated into 3
areas. In regions II and III, the incumbent raises all voters to the level of the maximum
of his supporters; in region I, the incumbent raises everyone to the same level up to the
maximum allowed by his budget.
Example 5 If voters are distributed uniformly, then
v(θC) = B − (θC − θI)2 − (1− θC)2 (θC − θI) + (θC − θI)
θ∗C = 1/2.
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Figure 6: Universal Coalition: The incumbent moves everyone to the same level of utility,
up to the maximum allowed by his budget.
4.1.1 Quadratic Preferences
If voters have quadratic ideological preferences, there is an equally intuitive solution
v(θC) = B −
∫ 1
0
[d(0, θI , θC)− d(θ, θI , θC)] f(θ)dθ + d(0, θI , θC)
where d(θ, θI , θC) ≡ − (θ − θI)2+(θ − θC)2. Taking FOC condition with respect to θC , we
have 2θ∗C − 2
∫ 1
0
θf(θ)dθ ≡ 0. So θ∗C =
∫ 1
0
θf(θ)dθ. Thus unlike the case with Euclidean
preferences, if voters have quadratic preferences, and the incumbent can implement a
flooded strategy, the mean of the distribution. SOC condition equals 2, ensuring us that
we have a minimum.
4.2 Flooded
Groseclose and Snyder defines a flooded, non-universalistic coalition if the incumbent
buys a majority of voters, but not all voters. Figure 7 show this for a uniform distribution
of voters.
I will shows, however, that in the present model, the incumbent will never want to
implement a flooded coalition. Figure ?? shows why. Graphically, the incumbent will only
wish to implement a flooded coalition if the regions R and Q are of the same size. In the
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Figure 7: Flooded Coalition
present model, however,
∫
R
dθ ≥ ∫ θm
0
(θC − θI)dθ = 12(θC − θI) =
∫ 1
m
(θC − θI)dθ >
∫
Q
dθ.
Therefore, the criterion for flooded optimal coalition is never satisfied. This is of course
a result of choosing the Euclidean preferences and uniform distribution, which results in
the inverse of the buying being not one-to-one in certain distributions.
4.3 Non-flooded
As in Groseclose and Snyder, there is a non-flooded equilibrium when θ2 > 0, and
BC ≤
∫ θ′
0
d(θ, θI , θC)dθ, where θ
′ = θI+θC
2
, and θ2 will be defined below in expression 16,
then the incumbent will choose a non-flooded buying strategy. Geometrically, this occurs
when that the size of R is equal to the size of Q. This guarantees that the equation has
a maximum within (θI , θC).
The incumbent chooses the optimal number of voters to buy by choosing θ∗2 such that
max
θI<θ2<θC
(−2θ2 + θI + θC)
(
BI − (θC − θ2)2
2(θC − θ2) + θC −
1
2
)
(16)
The challenger will find the location that minimizes the above expression over θC
min
θC
(−2θ∗2(θC) + θI + θC)
(
BI − (θC − θ∗2(θC))2
2(θC − θ∗2(θC))
+ θC − 1
2
)
.
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Figure 8: Why flooded coalition is not optimal.
The analytical solution of those equations however proved to be hopelessly complicated,
and I was unable to find a way to simplify the expressions. Therefore I will resort to
numerical solutions to find their optimal value.
4.4 Non-flooded(b)
Because of the inverse function in the case of the Euclidean preferences is not one-to-one,
there exists a case that was not present in Groseclose and Snyder. Specifically, it occurs
when express [?] does not have an interior maximum.
Geometrically, it occurs when the height of region R reaches θC − θI , at which point
there is a discontinuity in the budget necessary to satisfy the Groseclose Snyder condi-
tion for non-flooded optimum. I am not able to obtain a closed-form solution for the
BI(θI) that does not satisfy the Groseclose and Snyder condition. I was able to obtain
it numerically. For example, let θI = 0.3, BI = 0.2, then expression 16 has no interior
maximum.
Proposition 9 The buying strategy in non-flooded coalition is sub-optimal. Further-
more, define [0, θ3] as the interval of voters that the incumbent will buy, the optimal
strategy of the incumbent is to choose maxt(·) θ3(t (·)), i.e., maximize the interval of vot-
ers in addition to the non-flooded coalition.
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Figure 9: Non-flooded coalition: The incumbent pays voters in the dashed line region.
For this strategy to be optimal, it must be that the red regions R and Q have equal size.
Proof. Denote the amount the incumbent adds to the utility of his coalition be y, the
measure of voters he adds to the coalition be x, and let λ be the total budget. The
amount the challenger needs to win is
L(x, y, λ) = (θC − θI + y)
(
1
2
− θI + x
)
− λ (y (1− θI) + x (2θC − 2θI + y)− γ)
where γ = BI−(1−θI−θC)2(θC−θI)+(θC − θI)2 is the budget leftover from implementing
the non-flooded strategy. Solving for the FOC of Lx = 0, we have y = −2(θC−θI)(θI−x).
Since by assumption max(x) = θI , this implies y ≤ 0. Thus there is no interior solution
for x > 0.
We now consider the two boundary solutions. Define L1 as the amount that the
incumbent can raise the utility of his coalition, and L2 as the interval of voters not in
the incumbent coalition that the incumbent can buy.
L1 =
(
γ
1− θI + θC − θI
)(
1
2
− θI
)
L2 =
(
γ
2(θC − θI) +
1
2
− θI
)
(θC − θI).
Subtracting L2− L1 = θIγ
2−2θI > 0. Thus buying more voters is the optimal strategy.
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Figure 10: Non-flooded coalition (b)
In this case, the amount the challenger requires for a given θC is t(θI,θC , BI) =
BI−(θC−θI)2
2(θC−θI) −
(
1
2
− θC
)
, (θC − θI). The challenger therefore wishes to minimize this
amount,
u(θI , θC , B) = F (BC > t(θI , θC , BI))
= 1− F
([
BI − (θC − θI)2
2(θC − θI) −
(
1
2
− θC
)]
(θC − θI)
)
So the challenger wishes to minimize F (BC > t(θI , θC , BI)). Taking FOC with respect
to θC gives −12 + θC ≡ 0, thus θC = 12 .
4.5 Lame Duck
There is the one more region in the model to complete the solution space. It occurs when
the incumbent is too far away from the median and does not have enough money to buy
over the median voter, and thus loses for sure if the challenger stands within the winset.
To defeat a challenger who has no money, the incumbent needs to have a budget of size
BI >
(
1
2
− θC
)
(θC − θI) + 1
4
(θC − θI)2
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The challenger chooses θC =
1
3
(θI + 1) to maximize BI , which implies that it must be
that B > 1
3
(1
2
− θI)2 to defeat any challenger.
I have thus characterized θ∗C if the challenger had full information about the budget
of the incumbent. Figure 11 presents the optimal ideological location for the incumbent
given θI and BI . Except for the non-flooded regions, I was able to find the analytical
solution for the optimal challenger location. However, it is only in the non-flooded region
where θ∗C varies.
0
0.2
0.4
 
I
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Budget
0.4
0.425
0.45
0.475
0.5
 
C
Figure 11: θ∗C given budget of incumbent and θI .
4.6 Optimal Candidate Ideological Position
Because some of the cases were only solved numerically, I was not able to find the optimal
expected analytically. Figure 12 shows the numerical solution to the optimal challenger
location in the game.
The figure shows something very intuitive. Namely, that the challengers trades off the
tension of building a bigger coalition by locating himself closer to the incumbent, versus
maximizing the amount that the incumbent has to pay his winning coalition by locating
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Figure 12: Optimal θ∗C given θI and distribution of BI .
closer to the median. The numerical results show that θ∗C(θI + ε, TI) > θ
∗
C(θI , TI), and
that θ∗C(θI , TI + ε) > θ
∗
C(θI , TI).
It also shows that, in contrast to the case where the challenger budget equals 0, a
challenger with transfers immediately moves to the median of the distribution under a
wide range of parameters. It is also interesting that under quadratic preferences, when
the incumbent is able to operate a universal buying rule, the challenger moves to the mean
of the distribution instead of the median. This suggests that for any order statistic, we
can also find some utility function that will induce the challenger to move toward that
location.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I explored some implications to the spatial model if we introduce utility for
private goods, e.g., transfers to the utility function of the voters. I find that this addition
introduces a number of useful features into the standard model. The present model is able
to pin down the optimal location of the incumbent in multi-dimensional ideological space
where the core does not exist. It also creates ideological separation in both the single-
dimensional and multi-dimensional case, although admittedly in the single dimensional
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case the incumbent is not acting optimally by location off the core. The model also shows
that the incumbent will have an incentive to create super-majorities, a la Groseclose and
Snyder, where there may exist voters who do receive no transfers.
One major area of this model which I did not pursue was to allow voter utility
functions to differ. Throughout the model I have assumed that all voters have identical
utility functions. Indeed the original motivation of this model was the conjecture that by
allowing voter utility functions to differ, specifically a world where there are differences in
the relative marginal utility for ideological location and transfers, candidates will exploit
this difference by locating closer to the voters with high valuation for ideology and give
more transfers to those with high valuation for transfers. That model however, proved
to have several complications, the most important one being that in a sequential world
like the present one, there is always a tendency to move toward to majority, regardless
of differences of the utility functions. I.e., the candidates will both locate near and
give transfers to voters with low(high) relative valuation for transfers, so long as they
constitute a majority. Moving to a simultaneous world runs immediately to the “Colonel
Blotto” problem where the Nash equilibrium is unsolvable for all practical considerations.
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